neco against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 0 USDCLimited by manipulation cost
- Depth within 5%
- buy20.12 USDC (shortened; full value 20.1251516970035975325976406606 USDC)sell20.51 USDC (shortened; full value 20.511267703376610642867587970465944663402536518586 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 0 USDCReachable at no cost: nothing stands in the way
- Checks
- 3 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.01765198 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0176519847167578 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.01862326 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0186232680186736 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.01765198 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0176519847167578 USDC)
Checks
MANIPULATION_CHEAPMANIPULATION_RATIO_LOWTHIN_DEPTH_5PCTNO_GENUINE_TRADE_30DNO_GENUINE_TRADE_7DNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 0 USDC
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh