xRUNES against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Medium
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 3.31 USDC (shortened; full value 3.317032551675538650005449085114325632099361656952 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy3.21 USDC (shortened; full value 3.2117449723002256505831859849 USDC)sell3.27 USDC (shortened; full value 3.273364688805408774901710693602245337995856781556 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 2 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.00136008 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0013600843598554 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.00139914 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0013991407487067 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.00137267 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0013726741905989 USDC)
Checks
THIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh