XTAR against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 0.02 USDC (shortened; full value 0.02077655000005 USDC)Limited by manipulation cost
- Depth within 5%
- buy191.43 USDC (shortened; full value 191.4379249639330413659383313167 USDC)sell120.15 USDC (shortened; full value 120.1539546629896266546828052058936557739218581127 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 0.08 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0831062000002 USDC)Reachable through the order book
- Checks
- 5 triggered3 not evaluated
History
No readings were stored in this range from this source
The engine accepted the request and returned nothing for Hubble. The series is as old as the deployment, so a window can reach back further than anything that was recorded. It is not empty because the figures were zero.
Checks
Triggered5
- Cheap to move the price
- Cheap next to real trading
- Extreme spread
- Thin depth at 5%
- Supply is concentrated
Not evaluated3
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0.08 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0831062000002 USDC)
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 0.08 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0831062000002 USDC)
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh