XLMFISHz against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
High
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 10.99 USDC (shortened; full value 10.994925016974002186515993977559831891552187845326 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy10.64 USDC (shortened; full value 10.6459296355854446239703853518 USDC)sell10.85 USDC (shortened; full value 10.850179715133037505834221735853078196793947104453 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 3 triggered5 not evaluated
History
No readings were stored in this range from this source
The engine accepted the request and returned nothing for Hubble. The series is as old as the deployment, so a window can reach back further than anything that was recorded. It is not empty because the figures were zero.
Checks
Triggered3
- One holder owns most of it
- Thin depth at 5%
- Supply is concentrated
Not evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 1,549.77 USDC (shortened; full value 1549.77630729606375 USDC)
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh