LGSw against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
High
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 2.77 USDC (shortened; full value 2.774258326660046978474890139728552688357205377232 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy2.68 USDC (shortened; full value 2.6861992138158584976940102437 USDC)sell2.73 USDC (shortened; full value 2.737735943991926269227992327517546961698603827896 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 3 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.43511539 USDC (shortened; full value 0.4351153987328478 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.44671954 USDC (shortened; full value 0.446719543033557 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.43972350 USDC (shortened; full value 0.4397235036055692 USDC)
Checks
HOLDER_CONCENTRATION_EXTREMETHIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh