LFI against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 0 USDCLimited by manipulation cost
- Depth within 5%
- buy3.79 USDC (shortened; full value 3.7936384084747070744013801262 USDC)sell3.86 USDC (shortened; full value 3.866422183422431656890500395837707759343799743875 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 0 USDCReachable at no cost: nothing stands in the way
- Checks
- 5 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.37607176 USDC (shortened; full value 0.3760717698578664 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.38427359 USDC (shortened; full value 0.3842735912679306 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.37812083 USDC (shortened; full value 0.3781208322755827 USDC)
Checks
MANIPULATION_CHEAPMANIPULATION_RATIO_LOWHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_EXTREMETHIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 0 USDC
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh