Indocoin against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
High
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 2.73 USDC (shortened; full value 2.736393190996998211416948993315106005331058408166 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy2.64 USDC (shortened; full value 2.6495359742495683888283999175 USDC)sell2.70 USDC (shortened; full value 2.700369292900835545710408941427463092652640274473 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 3 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Cost to move the price 50%
The stored series carries one manipulation rung, the +50% move. A reading the engine could not produce breaks the line rather than sitting at zero.
Too few readings in this window to show a direction.
No point in this range carried a value.
Checks
HOLDER_CONCENTRATION_EXTREMETHIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNO_GENUINE_TRADE_30DNO_GENUINE_TRADE_7DNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh