GROG against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 45.71 USDC (shortened; full value 45.711995352641137772674892342662513818663285707361 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy0 USDCsell64.10 USDC (shortened; full value 64.105915351549725357551347675860794887861059960354 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 229.14 USDC (shortened; full value 229.1403381 USDC)Reachable through the order book
- Checks
- 6 triggered3 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Unchanged across the window
- Lowest
- 0.00000015 USDC
- Highest
- 0.00000015 USDC
- Mid price
- 0.00000015 USDC
Checks
ZERO_DEPTH_2PCTMANIPULATION_CHEAPSPREAD_EXTREMEHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_EXTREMETHIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated3
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 229.14 USDC (shortened; full value 229.1403381 USDC)
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 229.14 USDC (shortened; full value 229.1403381 USDC)
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh