ETH against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 53.14 USDC (shortened; full value 53.143296551458975057524090980463185657669774536692 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy0 USDCsell75.81 USDC (shortened; full value 75.815526717994450735288844111033362346231757950868 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 9,196.72 USDC (shortened; full value 9196.7252771 USDC)Reachable through the order book
- Checks
- 6 triggered3 not evaluated
History
No readings were stored in this range from this source
The engine accepted the request and returned nothing for Hubble. The series is as old as the deployment, so a window can reach back further than anything that was recorded. It is not empty because the figures were zero.
Checks
Triggered6
- Nothing tradable within 2%
- Cheap to move the price
- Extreme spread
- One holder owns most of it
- Thin depth at 5%
- Supply is concentrated
Not evaluated3
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 9,196.72 USDC (shortened; full value 9196.7252771 USDC)
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 9,196.72 USDC (shortened; full value 9196.7252771 USDC)
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh